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Abstract
I present a framework for analyzing decision making under imper-
fect understanding of correlation structures and causal relations. A
decision maker (DM) faces an objective long-run probability distrib-
ution p over several variables (including the action taken by previous
DMs). He is characterized by a subjective causal model, represented
by a directed acyclic graph over the set of variable labels. The DM
attempts to t this model to p, resulting in a subjective belief that
distorts p by factorizing it according to the graph via the standard
Bayesian-network formula. As a result of this belief distortion, the
DMs evaluation of actions can vary with their long-run frequencies.
Accordingly, I dene a "personal equilibrium" notion of individual
behavior. The framework enables simple graphical representations of
causal-attribution errors (such as coarseness or reverse causation), and
provides tools for checking rationality properties of the DMs behavior.
I demonstrate the frameworks scope of applications with examples
covering diverse areas, from demand for education to public policy.
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1 Introduction
The rational-expectations postulate entails that agents in an economic model
perfectly understand its equilibrium statistical regularities - in particular, the
structure of correlations among variables. In recent years, economists have
become increasingly interested in equilibrium models that relax this extreme
assumption. This paper proposes an approach to modeling decision makers
(DMs) with an imperfect understanding of equilibrium correlations, based
on the idea that such aws arise from an attempt to t a misspecied causal
model to the equilibrium distribution.
Consider a DM whose vNM utility function u is dened over a collection
of variables x = (x1; :::; xn), where x1 is the DMs action. Imagine that before
choosing how to act, the DM gets access to a "historical database" consisting
of (innitely) many joint observations of the relevant variables - including
the actions taken by previous DMs facing the same decision problem. The
empirical distribution p over x in the database obeys the textbook chain rule:
p(x)  p(x1)p(x2 j x1)p(x3 j x1; x2)    p(xn j x1; :::; xn 1) (1)
To represent a DM who might misperceive the correlation structure of
long-run distributions, I propose an extension of the chain rule. The DM
is characterized by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) R over the set of nodes
f1; :::; ng.1 The DMs subjective belief distorts every objective long-run dis-
tribution p by "factorizing it according to R", via the formula
pR(x) =
nY
i=1
p(xi j xR(i)) (2)
where R(i) denotes the set of direct parents of the node i in the DAG, and
xR(i) is the projection of x on R(i). For instance, if R : 1! 2! 3 4, then
pR(x) = p(x1)p(x4)p(x2 j x1)p(x3 j x2; x4).
A DAG R and the set of distributions representable by (2) dene what is
1A directed graph is dened by a set of nodes and a set of directed links between nodes.
The graph is acyclic if it does not contain any directed path from a node to itself.
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known as a Bayesian network. This concept was introduced by statisticians
as a representation of conditional-independence assumptions, and has become
ubiquitous in Articial Intelligence as a platform for e¢ cient probabilistic-
inference algorithms (see Cowell et al. (1999) and Koski and Noble (2009)
for textbooks). In the present context, the DAG R is the DMs "type", and
(2) describes how this type distorts every objective distribution p into the
subjective belief pR. When R is fully connected, it reduces (2) to a standard
chain rule, thus representing a DM with rational expectations. At the other
extreme, when R is empty, it represents a DM who cannot perceive any
correlations that might actually exist: pR(x) = p(x1)    p(xn).
Pearl (2009) advocated the view of DAGs as causal structures that un-
derlie observed statistical regularities: the link j ! i means that xj is an
immediate cause of xi. Sloman (2009) presented psychological evidence that
people use intuitive causal models to perceive uncertain environments, and
employed DAGs to represent such models. The causal interpretation is con-
sistent with the directedness and acyclicity properties of R: a causal chain
from xi to xj should preclude a causal chain in the opposite direction. It also
gives content to the factorization formula (2): to predict xi conditional on
its causes, we only need to know the realization of its immediate causes.
Following Pearl and Sloman, I interpret R primarily as a subjective causal
model, such that pR is the outcome of the DMs attempt to t his (possibly
misspecied) causal model to "historical data". The causal model is entirely
non-parametric: it only posits the existence of certain causal links. The
DM extracts the correlation between xi and xR(i) (for each i = 1; :::; n) from
the "historical database" represented by p. He focuses on these particular
correlations because these are the ones that are required to quantify his causal
model. The following example illustrates the behavioral implications of this
idea.
An example: The Dieters Dilemma
A DM who wishes to improve his health considers a diet that involves ab-
staining from a food he likes. In reality, the DMs choice and his health are
statistically independent, yet they are potentially correlated with the level
of some chemical in the DMs blood. The latter variable is payo¤-irrelevant.
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Therefore, a DM with rational expectations would choose not to diet.
Let a; h; c denote the DMs action (i.e., dieting decision), state of health
and chemical level. Since a and h are independent, the objective long-run
distribution p can be written as p(a; h; c) = p(a)p(h)p(c j a; h). Thus, p
is consistent with a "true DAG" R : a ! c  h - i.e., a causal model
that posits a and h as independent causes of c.2 This is "as if" consistency:
although R may well describe an actual causal mechanism that underlies
p, as modelers we are free to regard R as a mere representation of purely
statistical independence between a and h.
Assume that our DMs subjective DAG is R : a ! c ! h - i.e., he
inverts the causal link between the chemical level and his health, relative to
the true DAG R. The DMs attempt to t his causal model to the long-run
distribution p generates the subjective belief pR(a; h; c) = p(a)p(c j a)p(h j c).
Guided by this belief, the DM will choose a to maximizeX
h
pR(h j a)u(a; h) =
X
h
X
c
p(c j a)p(h j c)u(a; h) (3)
Now impose additional structure on the true process: the chemical level is
normal when the DM is healthy or when he diets; otherwise, it is abnormally
high. Consequently, as long as not all historical DMs chose to diet, c and h
will exhibit non-degenerate correlation in the database, and therefore pR(h j
a) will be a non-constant function of a. Thus, although in reality a and h
are independent, the DMs estimated causal model leads him to perceive an
indirect causal e¤ect of a on h. The reason is that although the DM correctly
perceives the steady-state correlation between c and h, he mistakes it for a
direct causal e¤ect of c on h, which (according to R) implies an indirect
causal e¤ect of a on h.
Furthermore, the magnitude of this perceived e¤ect is sensitive to the fre-
quency of dieting in the database. To see why, note that the DMs subjective
causal model postulates that a and h are independent conditional on c (as
2In diagrams, I will often name nodes by the variablesintuitive labels (rather than by
the indices 1; :::n). Although this practice involves some abuse of notation, it facilitates
reading the graphs.
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evident from (3)). However, this is false: if we knew that the chemical level
is normal, learning whether the DM is dieting would a¤ect our prediction
of his state of health. It follows that the term p(h j c) in (3) is sensitive to
the marginal of p over a. In particular, a lower long-run frequency of dieting
strengthens the estimated correlation between h and c, and hence the DMs
subjective evaluation of dieting.
We are thus led to think of the DMs steady-state behavior as an equilib-
rium concept: the long-run distribution p is in equilibrium if it only assigns
positive probability to actions a that maximize the expectation of u(a; h) with
respect to pR(h j a). In Section 3.1, I show that when the direct disutility
from dieting is not too large, the DMs equilibrium probability of dieting is
positive. For a range of parameter values, the unique equilibrium is mixed - a
genuine equilibrium e¤ect that is impossible under standard expected-utility
maximization.3
I present the equilibrium model of individual choice in Section 2. For
expositional simplicity, I assume that the DM cannot condition his action on
any signal (Appendix C relaxes this assumption). An objective steady-state
distribution p is a "personal equilibrium" if whenever an action x1 is played
with positive probability, it maximizes the expectation of u with respect to
the conditional distribution pR(x2; :::; xn j x1). A conventional "trembling
hand" criterion handles zero-probability events.4
The integration of the Bayesian-network factorization formula (2) into an
equilibrium model of choice constitutes the papers rst main contribution.
It provides a framework for analyzing the behavior of a DM who forms his
beliefs by tting a subjective causal model to objective distributions. Be-
cause graphical causal models are entirely non-parametric, they are applica-
3The idea that the DMs long-run behavior may a¤ect his evaluation of actions when
he misperceives correlation structures has precedents in the literature (see Sargent (2001)
and Esponda (2008)). To my knowledge, this paper o¤ers the rst general articulation of
this idea.
4The term "personal equilibrium" was introduced by K½oszegi and Rabin (2006) and
K½oszegi (2010) in the context of decision making with reference-dependent preferences,
when the reference point is a function of the DMs expectation of his own choice.
Geanakopolos et al. (1989) study a model in which the DMs payo¤ is a direct func-
tion of his prior belief, and this can lead to equilibrium e¤ects in individual choice.
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ble to any static decision problem. The framework thus provides a "general
recipe" for transforming a standard rational-expectations model into an equi-
librium model with non-rational expectations: substitute pR(x2; :::; xn j x1)
for p(x2; :::; xn j x1) in the denition of individual best-replying, where p is
the true equilibrium distribution.
The papers other major contributions can be summarized as follows.
Capturing errors of causal/statistical reasoning
Section 3 and Appendix C present applications of personal equilibrium to
various domains. Each example is characterized by a "true DAG" R; the
DMs DAG R is obtained by performing a basic operation on R - removing,
inverting or reorienting links. Di¤erent operations capture di¤erent errors of
causal attribution - link inversion captures "reverse causation", link removal
captures "coarseness", etc. In specic contexts, these errors translate to well-
known statistical fallacies. E.g., Section 3.2 studies an example of parental
investment in education. The parents DAG distorts R by removing the
links owing from a node that represents the childs "latent ability" into
nodes that represent his school and labor-market outcomes. This removal
of links captures the fallacy of ignoring a confounding variable. In (po-
tentially multiple) personal equilibria, the parent over-invests in education.
As the examples show, the Bayesian-network framework o¤ers a language
for describing errors of causal attribution and for analyzing their behavioral
implications.
General characterizations of choice behavior
The framework is more than a language; it also provides tools for checking
general rationality properties of personal equilibrium. Section 4.1 states a
necessary and su¢ cient condition for the possibility of equilibrium e¤ects, in
terms of the structural relation between R and R. This condition is easy to
operationalize, thanks to a basic concept from the Bayesian-networks liter-
ature called d-separation (explained in Appendix B). Section 4.2 presents a
necessary and su¢ cient condition onR for the DMs behavior to be consistent
with rational expectations in all environments that share the same restriction
on the subset of payo¤-relevant variables. Results of this kind are valuable
6
because they illuminate the robustness of an economic models predictions to
departures from full-edged rational expectations. Finally, Section 4.3 shows
that two subjective DAGs never dominate one another in terms of objective
expected payo¤, unless exactly one of them is fully connected.
Bayesian networks as a unifying framework
This paper o¤ers a fresh look at the growing literature on equilibrium mod-
els with non-rational expectations. Osborne and Rubinstein (1998) studied
games with players who misperceive the consequences of their actions, due
to naive extrapolation from small samples. Eyster and Rabin (2005) as-
sumed that Bayesian-game players underestimate the correlation between
opponentsactions and signals. Madarasz (2012) modeled players who suf-
fer the "curse of knowledge". In Esponda (2008) and Esponda and Pouzo
(2014a), agents neglect the counterfactual e¤ect of their actions on the distri-
bution of payo¤consequences. Piccione and Rubinstein (2003), Jehiel (2005),
Jehiel and Koessler (2008), Mullainathan et al. (2008), Eyster and Piccione
(2013) and Schwartzstein (2014) studied models in which agentsbeliefs are
measurable with respect to a coarse representation of the set of contingencies
(by omitting variables from their subjective model or by clumping contingen-
cies into "analogy classes").5 Section 5 shows that some of these concepts can
be reformulated as special cases of the present framework (dened by suitable
R and R), or as renements and extensions thereof. Bayesian networks thus
o¤er a unifying framework, highlighting the thread of awed causal reasoning
that runs through equilibrium models with non-rational expectations.6
2 The Modeling Framework
Let X = X1     Xn be a nite set of states, where n  2. I refer to each
xi as a variable, and N = f1; :::; ng is the set of variable labels. For every
M  N and x 2 X, denote xM = (xk)k2M . The set X1 represents the set
5Similar elements of "coarse reasoning" appeared in macroeconomics under the title
"restricted perceptions equilibrium" (Evans and Honkapohja (2001), Woodford (2013)).
6Graphical probabilistic models were introduced into economics in other contexts: to
facilitate computation of Nash equilibria (Kearns et al. (2001), Koller and Milch (2003)),
or to discuss causality in econometric models (White and Chalak (2009)).
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of actions that are available to a decision maker (DM). Accordingly, I will
often use the notation X1 = A, x1 = a, x = (a; y), y = (x2; :::; xn). Note
that the DMs action is part of the description of a state. The DM is entirely
uninformed of y when he acts (Appendix C relaxes this assumption).
2.1 Beliefs
Let p 2 (X) be an objective probability distribution over states. To capture
limited understanding of the correlation structure of p, I introduce a new
primitive. A directed acyclic graph (DAG) is a pair (N;R), where N is the
set of nodes and R is the set of directed links. To describe a link from j to i, I
use the notations jRi and j ! i interchangeably. Let R(i) = fj 2 N j jRig
denote the set of "parents" of the node i. E.g., in the DAG 1 ! 3  2,
R(1) = R(2) = ? and R(3) = f1; 2g. In what follows, I identify the DAG
with R.
The DM is characterized by a "subjective DAG" R. For any objective
distribution p, the DMs subjective belief over X is pR, given by the factor-
ization formula (2).7 Thus, R is a short-hand for a mapping that assigns a
subjective belief to every objective distribution. It is instructive to compare
this to the traditional notion of subjective priors. Under the latter approach,
the DM has a xed belief that is independent of the objective distribution p.
In contrast, according to (2), the DMs subjective belief changes systemati-
cally with p.
We will say that p is consistent with a DAG R if pR(x)  p(x). If p is
consistent with R, it is necessarily consistent with every DAG that adds links
to R. For any three disjoint subsets B;C;D  N , the notation xB ?R xC j
xD means that xB and xC are independent conditional on xD, for every p that
is consistent with R. Appendix B presents a basic tool from the Bayesian-
networks literature, called d-separation, which characterizes the conditional-
independence properties satised by all distributions that are consistent with
a given DAG. Thus, a DAG can be viewed as a representation of a list of
7The formula contains potentially ill-dened terms, because it is possible that
p(xR(i)) = 0 for some i and x. This does not pose any di¢ culty for us, because we can
exclude zero-probability realizations of x when performing expected-utility calculations.
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conditional-independence properties. For example, the DAG 1 ! 3  2
represents the property x2 ? x1, while the DAG 1 ! 3 ! 2 represents the
property x2 ? x1 j x3. (Not every consistent list of conditional-independence
properties has a DAG representation.)
The DMs subjective distribution over y conditional on a is dened as
usual,
pR(y j a) = pR(a; y)
pR(a)
=
pR(a; y)P
y0 pR(a; y
0)
(4)
as long as pR(a) > 0.
The interpretation of R
I regard the DMs DAG R as a subjective causal model : for every i, R(i)
represents the collection of variables that the DM perceives as immediate
causes of xi (alternative interpretations are discussed in Section 6). The
subjective belief pR is the outcome of the DMs attempt to t his causal model
to long-run data generated by p. The DM does not have any preconception
regarding the sign or magnitude of causal relations - he infers those from
the data; his causal model merely postulates causal links and their direction.
The causal interpretation justies the inclusion of the DMs action in the
description of a state - the DMs subjective model establishes causal relations
among all variables, including the action.
The following image makes the causal interpretation more concrete. The
DM has access to a rich "historical database" consisting of many observations
of joint realizations of a and y, independently drawn from p. He poses a
sequence of n questions to the database, where question i is: "What is the
distribution over xi conditional on xR(i)?" The DM poses these particular
questions because he looks for the correlations that are required to complete
the specication of his causal model. The data does not "speak for itself";
extracting correlations from it requires an e¤ort, which the DM exerts only
if it serves the identication of his model. In particular, he does not look
for additional correlations that could test whether his model is misspecied.
The DM forms his belief by taking the product of the measured conditional
distributions p(xi j xR(i)), thus quantifying his causal model.
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Equivalent DAGs
A given p can be consistent with multiple DAGs, even when they do not
add links to one another. For instance, the DAGs 1 ! 2 and 2 ! 1
are both consistent with rational expectations, due to the basic identity
p(x1; x2)  p(x1)p(x2 j x1)  p(x2)p(x1 j x2). This suggests a natural
equivalence relation: two DAGs are equivalent if they represent the same
mapping from objective distributions to subjective beliefs.
Denition 1 Two DAGs R and Q are equivalent if pR(x)  pQ(x) for
every p 2 (X).
Thus, two di¤erent causal models can be indistinguishable in terms of the
statistical regularities they are consistent with. In particular, a DAG that
involves intuitive causal relations can be equivalent to a DAG that makes
little sense as a causal model (e.g., it postulates that the DMs action is
caused by his nal payo¤).
The following characterization of equivalent DAGs will be useful in the
sequel. it relies on two denitions. First, let ~R be the undirected version,
or skeleton of R - that is, i ~Rj if and only if iRj or jRi. Second, dene the
v-structure of a DAG R to be the set of all ordered triples of nodes (i; j; k)
such that iRk, jRk, i /Rj and j /Ri (that is, R contains links from i and j into
k, yet i and j are not linked to each other).
Proposition 1 (Verma and Pearl (1991)) Two DAGs R and Q are equiv-
alent if and only if they have the same skeleton and the same v-structure.
To illustrate this result, all fully connected DAGs have the same skeleton
and a vacuous v-structure; hence they are all equivalent (indeed, they all
induce rational expectations because they reduce (2) to a textbook chain
rule). In contrast, the DAGs 1 ! 2 ! 3 and 1 ! 2  3 are not equivalent
because they have identical skeletons but di¤erent v-structures (vacuous in
the former case, and consisting of the triple (1; 3; 2) in the latter).
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True and subjective DAGs
I will often restrict the domain of possible objective distributions p to be
those that are consistent with some DAG R. In this case, I will simply
say that the "true DAG" is R. Such domain restrictions arise naturally
when reality has an underlying causal structure. A fully connected DAG
corresponds to an unrestricted domain of objective distributions.
In the applications, the DMs subjective DAG R will be obtained from R
via one of the following simple operations: inverting, removing, reorienting
or adding links. These operations intuitively correspond to basic errors of
causal attribution. We saw that inverting a link captures reverse causation.8
Let us briey discuss the others:
(i) Removing a link captures coarseness. For example, if R : 1 ! 3  2
and R : 1! 3 2, then R captures a coarse perception of the causes of x3:
in reality, x3 is a function of both x1 and x2, yet R acknowledges only x1.
Thus, while in reality p(x) = p(x1)p(x2)p(x3 j x1; x2), the DMs subjective
belief is pR(x) = p(x1)p(x2)p(x3 j x1).
(ii) Changing the origin of a link captures misattribution. For instance, if
R : 1 3  2 and R : 1 ! 3 2, then R errs by attributing x3 to the
wrong cause (x1 instead of x2). Compare this example to the one used to
illustrate coarseness: the same R can capture di¤erent errors, depending on
its exact relation to R.
(iii)Adding a link captures spurious direct causation - i.e., the DM postulates
a direct causal relation that does not exist in reality. However, recall that if p
is consistent with R then it is also consistent with any DAG that adds links
to R. It follows that incorrect subjective beliefs that arise from spurious
direct causation are outside the frameworks scope.9
Throughout the paper, I will assume that R(1) = R(1) = ? - i.e. the
8Because inversion and reorientation seem to capture distinct errors, I consider them
"primitive", even though they can be decomposed into addition and removal of links.
9The operations need not preserve equivalence between DAGs. Let N = f1; 2; 3g and
omit the link 2 ! 3 from two linear orderings that contain it - one in which 1 ! 2
and another in which 3 ! 1. The resulting DAGs are not equivalent: 2  1 ! 3 and
2! 1 3.
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node that represents the DMs action is ancestral in both true and subjective
DAGs. This restriction is unnecessary: a DAG in which 1 is ancestral can be
equivalent to a DAG in which it is not. Nevertheless, I will adhere to it for
several reasons. First, it ts the causal interpretation: arguably, the DMs
action cannot be caused by something he is not informed of. Second, the
restriction simplies the expression for (4):
pR(x2; :::; xn j x1) =
nY
i=2
p(xi j xR(i))
Finally, the restriction suggests a natural denition of endogenous variables:
xi is endogenous according to R if i is a descendant of 1 (i.e., if there is a
directed path from 1 to i).
2.2 Decisions
Let us turn to decision making under the DAG representation of subjective
beliefs. Our DM is an expected utility maximizer, with a vNM utility func-
tion u : X ! R. Recall that p represents a long-run joint distribution over all
variables. We will require the DMs long-run behavior (given by the marginal
of p over a) to be optimal with respect to his pR(y j a) (i.e., the perceived
stochastic mapping from a to y). The belief distortion inherent in pR allows
pR(y j a) to vary with (p(a))a, which means that the marginal long-run dis-
tribution over actions can inuence the DMs evaluation of each course of
action. Therefore, we are led to dene individual choice as an equilibrium
notion.
To motivate the denition of equilibrium, suppose the above-mentioned
"historical database" is created by a long sequence of short-lived agents facing
the decision problem. The distribution p represents the historical joint dis-
tribution over the agentsactions and all other variables. Each agent forms a
subjective (possibly distorted) view of historical data given by pR, and takes
an action that maximizes his expected payo¤ according to this subjective
view. Equilibrium will correspond to a steady state of this dynamic.
As usual, equilibrium will require the DM to optimize with respect to his
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subjective belief. It would be conventional to treat (p(a))a as the object of
the denition and take (p(y j a))a;y (i.e., the true stochastic mapping from
a to y) as given. Instead, I will treat the entire joint distribution p as the
object of the formal denition. This is a contrivance that simplies notation
(in applications, I will x (p(y j a))a;y and nd (p(a))a).
The need for an equilibrium denition requires us to consider o¤-equilibrium
actions. I address this concern with a conventional "trembling hand" crite-
rion. We say that p0 is a perturbation of p if p0(y j a)  p(y j a) and the
marginal of p0 on A has full support. A perturbation xes every aspect of
p except the DMs behavior, such that every action is played with positive
probability.
Denition 2 (Personal equilibrium) Fix an arbitrary DAG R. A dis-
tribution p 2 (X) with full support on A is an "-perturbed personal
equilibrium if
a 2 arg max
a0
X
y
pR(y j a0)u(a0; y)
whenever p(a) > ". A distribution p 2 (X) is a personal equilibrium if
there exists a sequence pk ! p of perturbations of p, as well as a sequence
"k ! 0, such that pk is an "k-perturbed personal equilibrium for every k.
The concept of "-perturbed personal equilibrium allows the DM to exper-
iment with (subjectively) sub-optimal actions with probability " at most. To
use the historical-database metaphor, in order for its empirical distribution p
to be an "-perturbed equilibrium, it must be the case that if the frequency of
an action in the database is greater than ", then the DM nds it subjectively
optimal with respect to pR. Personal equilibrium simply takes the " ! 0
limit.
Proposition 2 Fix an arbitrary DAG R. For every (p(y j a))a;y, there exists
(p(a))a such that p = ((p(a)a; (p(y j a))a;y) is a personal equilibrium.
As we shall see in Section 3, "pure" personal equilibria (where the mar-
ginal of p over a is degenerate) need not exist. Note that if we restrict the
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domain of possible objective distributions to those that are consistent with
a true DAG R, then all personal equilibria are consistent with this DAG.
3 Illustrations
This section analyzes personal equilibria for various specications of true and
subjective DAGs R and R. In each example, R is obtained from R by one
of the basic operations discussed in Section 2. Each sub-section presents the
material in a di¤erent concrete economic context, thus illustrating the frame-
works scope of applications. The analyses follow a two-step "recipe". First,
I provide a basic characterization of the DMs personal-equilibrium behavior,
involving a formula for pR(y j a) that is based entirely on the structure of R.
Certain properties of this characterization can be gleaned from this formula
(aided by knowledge of the true DAG R and the payo¤-relevant variables).
These properties hold under any parameterization of the true process that
is consistent with R. In the second step, I impose parametric assumptions
on u and p(y j a) that t the economic scenario, and use them to obtain
closed-form expressions for the conditional-probability terms in the formula
for pR(y j a). This enables me to complete the characterization of personal
equilibria.10
3.1 Reversing Causation: Health and Lifestyle Choices
In this section I formally develop the example of the Dieters Dilemma, de-
scribed in the Introduction. The three variables, a; h; c, represent the DMs
nutritional choice, health outcome and chemical level. The DM is uninformed
of c and h at the time he chooses a. The variables a and h are statistically
independent, yet c is potentially correlated with both. Thus, every possible
objective distribution p can be written as p(a; h; c) = p(a)p(h)p(c j a; h) -
i.e., the true DAG is R : a! c h . If the DM had rational expectations,
10Throughout this section, the trembling-hand criterion in the denition of personal
equilibrium merely ensures that equilibria are well-dened, but the equilibria do not rely
on the selection of the sequence of perturbations. Trembles play a more interesting role
in the example analyzed in Appendix C.
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he would choose a to maximizeX
h
X
c
p(h)p(c j a; h)u(a; h; c)
Suppose that the DMs subjective DAG is R : a ! c ! h, such that
pR(a; h; c) = p(a)p(c j a)p(h j c). Thus, relative to the true DAG R, R
inverts the direction of the causal link between health and the chemical level.
If p is a personal equilibrium, then for every a0 for which p(a0) > 0,
a0 2 arg max
a
X
h
X
c
p(c j a)p(h j c)u(a; h; c)
According to the true DAG R, h is not necessarily independent of a condi-
tional on c. The conditional probability p(h j c) implicitly involves summing
over the DMs actions, where the weights are a¤ected by the marginal of p
over a; if (p(a))a were to change, so could p(h j c), and so could the DMs
subjectively optimal action. Thus, the equilibrium aspect of the DMs choice
is not redundant.
The following concrete example is approximated by this description. Ob-
servational studies revealed that low levels of Vitamin D are associated with
certain adverse health conditions. The common practice of prescribing Vita-
min D pills is justied by the interpretation of this observed correlation as a
causal e¤ect of Vitamin D deciency on health outcomes. Clinical tests that
directly tested for this e¤ect came later. In a systematic literature review
(which has admittedly generated controversy), Autier et al. (2014) argued
that these studies showed no e¤ect for many of the measured health indica-
tors, and suggested that a leading explanation for the null e¤ect is reverse
causation.11
The argument that a popularly held belief exhibits reverse causation can
11The debate over SSRI anti-depressants has similar contours - see
http://www.webmd.com/depression/features/serotonin for a popular description.
In both cases, the true causal mechanism is not known to medical researchers. To the
extent that drug intake and health are statistically independent, this regularity is merely
consistent with the reversecausation explanation. However, this consistency is all we
need to assume for the present exercise.
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be found in other contexts. Harris (1998) claimed that psychologiststen-
dency to attribute childrens personality traits to their parents behavior
may be a reverse-causation fallacy (e.g., children with a mild disposition may
cause parents to behave mildly). In macroeconomics, theories of the "Phillips
Curve" sometimes di¤er in the direction of causation between ination and
unemployment that they posit. Debates over the causal interpretation of the
correlation between GDP growth and income inequality or public debt are
another case in point.
For the rest of this sub-section, I impose additional structure. All vari-
ables take values in f0; 1g. The DMs payo¤ is purely a function of a and
h: u(a; h) = h   a. The interpretation is that a = 1 represents an action
referred to as "dieting" (taking a food supplement, abstaining from a favorite
type of food, etc.) the cost of which is , and h = 1 represents a good health
outcome. Let c = 0 represent a normal chemical level. The true stochastic
process is as follows: the probability of h = 1 is 1
2
, independently of a. The
value of c is a deterministic function of a and h, given by c = (1  a)(1  h).
Thus, the chemical level is abnormal if and only if the DMs health state
is poor and he does not diet. Under rational expectations, the DM would
choose a = 0 with certainty.
Let us now characterize personal equilibria under the DMs subjective
DAG R. Denote p(a = 0) = . We have specied p(h; c j a); hence it
remains to nd . Before stating the result, let us calculate a few relevant
conditional probabilities: p(c = 0 j a = 1) = 1, p(c = 0 j a = 0) = 1
2
,
p(h = 1 j c = 1) = 0 and
p(h = 1 j c = 0) =
1
2
 1
1
2
 1 + 1
2
 (1  ) =
1
2  
The fact that  appears in the last expression demonstrates our earlier
observation that it is not true that h ?R a j c. The intuition is simple. If we
learn that the DM is not dieting (a = 0), we can predict perfectly negative
correlation between c and h. In contrast, if we learn that the DM is dieting
(a = 1), health is equally likely to be good or bad, independently of the
chemical level. The lower the long-run frequency of dieting, the stronger the
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estimated (negative) correlation between health and the chemical level. The
example thus exhibits "strategic substitutability", in the sense that a higher
steady-state frequency of dieting leads to a smaller perceived e¤ect of c on
h, and this in turn weakens the DMs tendency to diet.
Proposition 3 Given the specication of R, u and (p(h; c j a))a;h;c in this
sub-section, there is a unique personal equilibrium, in which
 =
8><>:
0 if   1
4
2  1
2
if  2 (1
4
; 1
2
)
1 if   1
2
Proof. (Proofs of later results appear in Appendix A.) The DMs evaluation
of a = 0 given  is
pR(h = 1 j a = 0) =
p(c = 0 j a = 0)p(h = 1 j c = 0) + p(c = 1 j a = 0)p(h = 1 j c = 1) =
1
2
 1
2   +
1
2
 0
The DMs evaluation of a = 1 given  is
pR(h = 1 j a = 1)   =
p(c = 0 j a = 1)  p(h = 1 j c = 0) + p(c = 1 j a = 1)  p(h = 1 j c = 1)]   =
1  1
2   + 0  0  
Note that when the DM evaluates an action, he takes  as given, as required
by the notion of personal equilibrium. In "-perturbed personal equilibrium,
 > " ( < 1   ") only if a = 0 (1) attains the highest evaluation. Taking
the "! 0 limit gives the result.12
Thus, although dieting is unambiguously sub-optimal under rational ex-
pectations, it is played with positive probability in personal equilibrium given
12The trembling-hand aspect of the equilibrium concept is a mere formal nicety in all
the examples of this section. Therefore, I will skip the step that examines "-perturbed
equilibrium in proofs of later results in this section.
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the DMs subjective DAG, as long as it is not too costly. The intuition is as
follows. Suppose the DM plays a = 0 in a putative equilibrium. Then, he
learns a perfectly negative correlation between c and h. He correctly grasps
the e¤ect of his own action on the chemical level. And since he misperceives
the correlation between c and h as a causal e¤ect of the former on the latter,
he erroneously concludes that the normal chemical level attained thanks to
dieting will lead to good health. This is not the usual logic of self-conrming
expectations (Fudenberg and Levine (1993)): the DMs reasoning does not
rest on o¤-equilibrium beliefs, but on incorrect causal inference from statis-
tical regularities on the equilibrium path.
The possibility of a "mixed" unique equilibrium demonstrates that indi-
vidual choice in this model is fundamentally an equilibrium notion; such an
e¤ect would be impossible under conventional expected-utility maximization.
3.2 Coarseness I: Demand for Education
In this sub-section I present an example in which the DMs subjective DAG
commits a "coarseness" error of ignoring an exogenous confounding variable.
The example is couched in terms of demand for education. The DM is a
parent who chooses how much to invest in his childs education (I use a
female pronoun for the child). There are four variables, denoted a; ; s; w,
representing the parents investment, the childs innate ability, her school
performance and her labor-market outcome (measured by her wage). The
parent is uninformed of , s and w at the time of choice. The true DAG R
is
a ! s  
& #
w
(5)
Note that  is an exogenous "confounder": it causes variation in both s and
w. The parents utility u is purely a function of a and w. Therefore, if the
parent had rational expectations, he would choose a to maximizeX

p()
X
s
p(s j a; )
X
w
p(w j ; s)u(a; w)
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Now suppose the parents subjective DAG removes the links of  in R.
Because  is payo¤-irrelevant, we can equivalently assume that R omits it
altogether - i.e., R : a ! s ! w. One interpretation is that the parent
neglects  because it is unobservable. In personal equilibrium, the parent
will choose a to maximizeX
s
p(s j a)
X
w
p(w j s)u(a; w)
This expression can be elaborated into
X
s
 X

p()p(s j a; )
!X
w
 X
0
p(0 j s)p(w j 0; s)
!
u(a; w)
Thus, the parents objective function involves two implicit summations over
the latent variable. The term p(0 j s) is sensitive to (p(a))a - e.g., if the
child performs well at school despite low parental investment, then she prob-
ably has high ability. It follows that individual choice in this example is
fundamentally an equilibrium notion.
In the rest of this sub-section I impose additional structure. Assume a
can take any value in [0; 1], whereas all other variables have two possible
realizations: high (denoted 1) or low (denoted 0).13 Let u(a; w) = w   (a),
where  is a twice-di¤erentiable, increasing and weakly convex cost function,
with 0(0) = 0, and 0(1)  1. Finally, assume p(s = 1 j a; ) = a and
p(w = 1 j ; s) = s, where 1 > 0. Thus, high ability is necessary for
both school and labor-market success; conditional on high ability, success
at school increases the probability of a high wage. Denote p( = 1) =  >
0. If the parent had rational expectations, he would choose a to maximize
[a1 + (1   a)0]   (a). The optimal action a would be given by the
rst-order condition, 0(a) = [1   0]. The following result characterizes
personal equilibria under the parents subjective DAG.
13Although the formal analysis so far has assumed nite action sets, the extension to a
continuum of actions is straightforward.
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Proposition 4 Given the specication of R, u and (p(; s; w j a))a;;s;w in
this sub-section, every personal equilibrium has the following structure: the
parent assigns probability one to some action a that solves the equation
0(a) = 

1   0 
(1  a)
(1  a) + 1  

(6)
If 0 is either weakly convex or weakly concave, a is unique.
According to Equation (6), the parent over-invests relative to the rational-
expectations benchmark. The reason is that he interprets the positive corre-
lation between s and w as a pure causal e¤ect of s on w, whereas in reality
the correlation is partly due to the confounder . This generates an upward
bias in the parents perceived marginal benet from education (given by the
R.H.S), thus leading him to over-invest.
In addition, the perceived marginal benet is a function of the equilibrium
investment a. The reason is that while the parents subjective DAG pos-
tulates that w ?R a j s, the true DAG violates this property; as a result, the
perceived causal e¤ect of s on w is sensitive to the parents equilibrium behav-
ior. In particular, higher long-run investment raises the perceived marginal
benet of education. To see why, note that success at school implies high la-
tent ability, and the two jointly imply high expected wage. In contrast, poor
school performance is a strong indicator of low ability only when parental
investment is high. Therefore, the measured gap E(w j s = 1) E(w j s = 0)
increases with long-run investment. This "strategic complementarity" e¤ect
can lead to multiple personal equilibria, depending on how the curvature of
0 behaves.14
Comment: Direct measurement of a  w correlation
In this example, the DM ends up mispredicting the e¤ect of education on
wages - i.e., pR(w j a) 6= p(w j a) for some a; w (likewise in the Dieters
Dilemma, pR(h j a) 6= p(h j a) for some a; h). This begs the question: if the
14The multiplicative form of p(s j a; ) and p(w j ; s) magnies the strategic comple-
mentarity e¤ect, but it is not necessary for it. A similar e¤ect would appear under an
additive specication of these conditional probabilities, for su¢ ciently high values of a.
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DMs payo¤ is purely a function of a and w, why does he not test directly
for the e¤ect of a on w?
There are several possible answers. First, my modeling approach retains
the traditional separation between guring out the feasible set and choosing
from it. Our DM rst attempts to fully specify his causal model in order
to understand what is feasible. Only then does he proceed to the choice
stage (much as an econometrician estimates a given model, independently
of the particular decision problem that will be subsequently faced). Second,
processing data carries an implicit cost, and our DM is willing to incur it
only if he thinks it might change his beliefs. If the DM puts su¢ cient faith
in his causal model, he will not nd it worthwhile to test for a w correlation.
Furthermore, this test may simply be infeasible at the time of choice. For
example, in the context of the Dieters Dilemma, it is realistic to assume that
direct evidence regarding the e¤ect of nutrition on a target health variable
becomes available long after the accumulation of observational data regarding
the correlation between the chemical level and health.
3.3 Coarseness II: Public Policy
The previous sub-section examined a DM who ignores the causal e¤ects of an
exogenous confounding variable. Now I turn to a DM who misunderstands
the role of an endogenous variable in the causal chain from his action to
some target variable. Failure to account for endogeneity is a common target
of economistscriticism of public policy. When a government evaluates tax
or tari¤ reforms, it may take certain consumption or investment quantities as
given, whereas in fact they are endogenous variables that respond to changes
in policy. Likewise, when a higher-education regulator considers changing
the minimal accreditation requirement of some degree, he may neglect the
possible e¤ect on the composition of the applicant pool, and therefore on
graduatesultimate quality.
In macroeconomics, neglect of the response of private-sector expectations
to policy changes was a primary object of the Lucas Critique (Lucas (1976)).
Sargent (2001) modeled a central bank that commits this "sin": it evaluates
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policy according to a classical Phillips curve that ignores private-sector ex-
pectations (thus implicitly holding them xed), whereas the true process is
given by a Phillips curve that incorporates rational private-sector expecta-
tions. The simple example analyzed in this sub-section is based on Sargents
model: it distills its underlying causal misperception, using a di¤erent para-
meterization that generates new insights.
Formally, there are four variables, a; y; e; z, where a represents the gov-
ernments policy; y and z represent two di¤erent "macro" variables; and e
represents the private sectors expectation of y. Assume that u is purely a
function of y and z. The true DAG R is
a ! y ! z
& %
e
(7)
If the government had rational expectations, it would choose a to maximizeX
y
X
e
p(y j a)p(e j a)
X
z
p(z j y; e)u(y; z)
Now suppose that the governments subjective DAG R di¤ers from R by
removing at least one of the two links of e (or by eliminating this node and
its links altogether). In personal equilibrium, if p(a) > 0, then a maximizesX
y
p(y j a)
X
z
p(z j y)u(y; z) (8)
=
X
y
p(y j a)
X
z
 X
a0
X
e
p(a0 j y)p(e j a0)p(z j y; e)
!
u(y; z)
The governments failure to fully account for the causal channel that passes
through e means that when it calculates p(z j y), it e¤ectively sums over a
and e, weighted according to the governments long-run behavior.
Let us impose additional structure. The variables a and y take values in
f0; 1g; p(y = 1 j a) = a, where  > 0 is a parameter that captures the
governments ability to control y. The private sector has rational expecta-
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tions, such that for every a, e = E(y j a) = a with probability one. The
variable z is a deterministic function of y and e, given by z = y + e, where
 6= 0. Finally, u(y; z) = z y, where  > 0 is the governments rate of sub-
stitution between the two macro variables. If the government had rational
expectations, it would choose a = 1 whenever  < 1 + .
The parameter  captures a distinction that turns out to be important
for our analysis. When  > 0, private-sector expectations have a reinforcing
e¤ect. For example, a = 1 represents an intervention that is meant to pre-
vent currency depreciation; y is the direct e¤ect of this action. Private-sector
expectations respond to this intervention and boost demand for the currency,
creating a "multiplier e¤ect". Conversely, when  < 0, private-sector expec-
tations have a countervailing e¤ect. For instance, a = 1 represents monetary
expansion; y represents ination and z represents real output. As in Sargent
(2001), the government is averse to ination, but regards it as a possible
means for increasing real output via a Phillips e¤ect; in reality, this e¤ect
exists only to the extent that ination is not anticipated by the private sector.
Proposition 5 Given the specication of R, u and (p(y; e; z j a))a;y;e;z in this
sub-section, the set of personal equilibria is as follows. Denote p(a = 1) = .
(i) When   1, there is an equilibrium in which  = 1. (ii) When   1+,
there is an equilibrium in which  = 0. (iii) When  is between 1 and 1+,
there is an equilibrium with
 =
 + 1  
 + (1  )
There exist no other equilibria.
Thus, as expected, the governments neglect of a reinforcing (countervail-
ing) e¤ect biases its behavior toward a = 0 (a = 1). A less obvious qualitative
di¤erence concerns equilibrium multiplicity: when  > 0 there is a unique
personal equilibrium, whereas multiple equilibria are possible under  < 0.
The intuition is as follows. The governments causal model implies that the
distribution over z is independent of its action conditional on y. This is
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correct under y = 1, a realization that can only occur if the government has
played a = 1. However, it is incorrect under the realization y = 0. This leads
the government to form a biased estimate of E(z j a = 0). According to the
true model, a = 0 implies z = 0 with certainty, whereas
ER(z j a = 0) = E(z j y = 0) = p(a = 1 j y = 0)   (9)
The bias is positive (negative) when private-sector expectations have a rein-
forcing (countervailing) e¤ect.
Imagine that  goes up. Since p(a = 1 j y = 0) increases with , the
bias given by (9) becomes more severe. When  > 0, this means that the
governments overvaluation of a = 0 worsens; hence its perceived incentive
to play a = 1 weakens. Thus, when private-sector expectations have a re-
inforcing e¤ect, the model exhibits strategic substitutability: the pressure to
play a = 1 decreases with the long-run frequency of this action. This in
turn implies equilibrium uniqueness. In contrast, the case of  < 0 generates
"strategic complementarity"; hence the possibility of multiple equilibria.
Another noteworthy feature is that while the parameter  plays no role
in the rational-expectations case, it matters for personal equilibrium given
the governments subjective DAG. The reason is that a change in  a¤ects
the governments biased estimate of E(z j y = 0).
4 General Analysis
In this section I characterize rationality properties of personal equilibrium,
using elementary tools from the Bayesian-networks literature. Results are
stated in terms of structural features of true and subjective DAGs, involving
no parametric restrictions on u and p(y j a). For expositional ease, I present
the simplest versions of the results. In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, I use x1 (rather
than a) to denote the DMs action. I employ two graph-theoretic denitions.
A subset M  N is a clique in R if i ~Rj for every distinct i; j 2M . A clique
M is ancestral if R(i) M for every i 2M .
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4.1 Consequentialist Rationality
In the illustrations, individual optimization under a misspecied subjective
DAG led to genuine equilibrium e¤ects (mixed unique equilibrium, multiple
equilibria). Equilibrium e¤ects would not arise if the DMs perception of
the mapping from actions to consequences were invariant to long-run action
frequencies. I refer to such invariance as "consequentialistj rationality".
Denition 3 A DAG R is consequentialistically rational with respect to
a true DAG R if the following holds for every pair of objective distributions
p; q that are consistent with R: if p(x2; :::; xn j x1) = q(x2; :::; xn j x1) for
every x, then pR(x2; :::; xn j x1) = qR(x2; :::; xn j x1) for every x.
Consequentialistic rationality requires that if we modify an objective dis-
tribution p that is consistent with R only by changing its marginal over x1 -
without changing the stochastic mapping from x1 to x2; :::; xn - then the DMs
perception of this mapping should remain unchanged as well. When R is con-
sequentialistically rational with respect to R, we can rewrite the denition of
personal equilibrium as a maximization problem, because pR(x2; :::; xn j x1)
is invariant to (p(x1))x1 . When consequentialistj rationality is violated, in-
dividual behavior will exhibit equilibrium e¤ects for some specications of
p; u. Clearly, any DAG is consequentialistically rational with respect to itself.
From now on, I will take it for granted that R 6= R.
Proposition 6 The subjective DAG R is consequentialistically rational with
respect to R if and only if for every i > 1, 1 =2 R(i) implies xi ?R x1 j xR(i).
Thus, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for consequentialistj rationality
is the following: whenever R fails to include the DMs action as an immediate
cause of some other variable xi, it must be the case that for every distribution
that is consistent with R, xi is independent of x1 conditional on xR(i). The
proof consists of simply writing down the explicit formula for pR(x2; :::; xn j
x1) and checking its individual terms. When R is fully connected - i.e.,
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when the domain of p is unrestricted - the condition for consequentialistj
rationality becomes 1 2 R(i) for every i > 1.
To illustrate this result, recall the Dieters Dilemma, where true and
subjective DAGs were R : 1 ! 3  2 and R : 1 ! 3 ! 2 (using variable
indices rather than intuitive labels). Since 1 2 R(3) and 1 =2 R(2) = f3g,
Proposition 6 implies that we only need to check whether x2 ?R x1 j x3. As
observed in Section 3.1, this property does not hold; hence consequentialistj
rationality is violated.
Alternatively, for the same R : 1! 3 2, suppose the DMs subjective
DAG is R : 1 ! 3 2. This DM is "fully coarse/cursed" in the sense of
Eyster and Rabin (2005) and Jehiel and Koessler (2008): he fails to perceive
the e¤ect of the exogenous state x2 on the nal consequence x3. The DM
will choose x1 to maximizeX
x2;x3
pR(x2; x3 j x1)u(x1; x2; x3) =
X
x2
X
x3
p(x2)p(x3 j x1)u(x1; x2; x3)
If the DM had rational expectations, p(x3 j x1) would be replaced with
p(x3 j x1; x2) in this expression. To see why consequentialistj rationality
holds, note that R(2) = ? and R(3) = f1g; by Proposition 6 we only need
to check that x2 ?R x1, which clearly holds.
When R and R are large, checking the conditional-independence con-
ditions of Proposition 6 can be a daunting task. However, it is greatly fa-
cilitated by a Bayesian-networks tool called d-separation, which provides a
linear-time algorithm for checking whether a conditional independence prop-
erty is satised by all the distributions that are consistent with a given DAG.
Appendix B presents the tool and illustrates its applicability in the present
context.
4.2 Behavioral Rationality
Consequentialistic rationality is a weak rationality requirement, which allows
the DM to choose an objectively sub-optimal action. In this sub-section I
look for a structural property of the DMs subjective DAG that will ensure
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fully rational behavior in terms of objective payo¤s. I impose no restriction
on the set of possible objective distributions - i.e., the true DAG R is fully
connected. Instead, I restrict the set of possible utility functions: there exists
a strict subset M  N , 1 2 M , such that u is purely a function of xM (i.e.,
it is constant in xN M). All the examples in Section 3 had this feature.
Denition 4 A DAG R is behaviorally rational if in every personal equi-
librium p, p(x1) > 0 implies x1 2 arg maxx01
P
x 1 p(x 1 j x01)u(x01; x 1).
As a rst step toward characterizing behavioral rationality, I examine the
following question: when is the DMs subjective marginal distribution over
some collection of variables guaranteed to be unbiased, despite his misspec-
ied subjective DAG? By denition, if R is not fully connected, then there
exists an objective p such that pR 6= p. However, pR may agree with p on
some projections. The next result characterizes which ones.
Proposition 7 (Spiegler (2015)) Let R be a DAG and let S  N . Then,
pR(xS)  p(xS) for every p if and only if S is an ancestral clique in some
DAG in the equivalence class of R.
For instance, let n = 3 and R : 1 ! 2  3. Then, pR(x2) is biased
for some p, because the node 2 is not ancestral in R (and no other DAG
is equivalent to R, by Proposition 1). In contrast, when R : 1 ! 2 ! 3,
pR(x3) coincides with p(x3) because 3 is ancestral in the equivalent DAG
R0 : 3 ! 2 ! 1. In both examples, pR(x1; x3) does not coincide with
p(x1; x3) for every p, because the nodes 1 and 3 are not linked and therefore
cannot form a clique (let alone an ancestral one) in any equivalent DAG.
Proposition 8 The DM is behaviorally rational if and only if M is an an-
cestral clique in some DAG in the equivalence class of R.
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Thus, when all payo¤-relevant variables are causally linked and have no
other cause (according to some DAG in the equivalence class of the DMs sub-
jective DAG), the DM is behaviorally rational. Otherwise, there are specica-
tions of p; u for which his behavior is inconsistent with rational expectations.
Application: When can coarseness lead to sub-optimal behavior?
The modeling framework enables us to formulate the following question:
When does a specic error of causal attribution (captured by a basic op-
eration on the true DAG) violate behavioral rationality? The following is an
example of such an exercise. LetM = f1; ng. Recall that the true DAG R is
fully connected, and assume that n is a terminal node in R (i.e., n =2 R(i)
for all i < n). The interpretation is that the variable xn is an ultimate
consequence, such that the DMs payo¤ depends only on his action and the
ultimate consequence. Now suppose that the DMs subjective DAG R di¤ers
from R only by omitting a single link.
Proposition 9 Suppose that the DMs subjective DAG R departs from the
true, fully connected DAG R by omitting one link i ! j. Then, the DM is
behaviorally rational if and only if j = n and i 6= 1.
Thus, even if the DM neglects the direct causal e¤ect of some intermediate
variable xi (i 6= 1; n) on the ultimate consequence xn, he is behaviorally
rational. In any other case, there are specications of p(x2; :::; xn j x1) and u
for which the DMs error will have payo¤ implications.
To illustrate this result, let N = f1; 2; 3g. When R : 1! 3 2 (omitting
the link 1! 2 from R), the DM regards x1 and x2 as independent causes of
x3; if, however, x2 is in fact a deterministic function of x1, the DM may err
by "double-counting" the e¤ect of x1 on x3. When R : 1! 2! 3 (omitting
the link 1! 3 from R), the DM regards x3 as independent of x1 conditional
on x2; if, however, x2 is in fact an independent variable, the DM will fail to
perceive any e¤ect of x1 on x3. Finally, when R : 2  1 ! 3 (omitting the
link 2! 3 from R), the DM correctly estimates the total causal e¤ect of x1
on x3, even though he fails to realize that it consists of direct and indirect
e¤ects (the latter runs through x2).
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4.3 Payo¤Ranking of DAGs
A more complete subjective DAG represents a more thorough understanding
of correlation structures; hence it intuitively captures "more rational" expec-
tations. Does this mean that it will always lead to better objective perfor-
mance? The following example shows the answer to be negative. Let n = 4,
and suppose R is fully connected and contains the links 1 ! 2 ! 3 ! 4.
Suppose further that u is purely a function of x1 and x4. Obtain the DAG R0
by removing the link 2! 3 from R. By Proposition 9, R0 is not behaviorally
rational - i.e., it is weakly dominated by R in terms of expected performance.
Now obtain R00 by removing the link 2! 4 from R0. It is easy to verify that
R
00
is equivalent to a DAG in which f1; 4g is an ancestral clique. By Proposi-
tion 8, a DM whose subjective DAG is R00 performs exactly like a DM whose
subjective DAG is R. Thus, removing a link from the DMs subjective DAG
can result in better performance for some u; p.15
I now examine the question with some generality. I return to the notation
x1 = a, x 1 = y. For expositional simplicity, suppose that 1 is an isolated
node in all relevant true and subjective DAGs. This guarantees consequen-
tialist rationality.
Denition 5 Let R;R0 be two DAGs in which the node that corresponds to
the DMs action is isolated. We say that R is more rational than R0 if for
every p; u; a; a0, the pair of inequalitiesX
y
pR(y)u(a; y) >
X
y
pR(y)u(a
0; y)X
y
pR0(y)u(a
0; y) >
X
y
pR0(y)u(a; y)
implies X
y
p(y)u(a; y) >
X
y
p(y)u(a0; y)
15Eyster and Piccione (2013) made an observation in the same spirit, in the context of
their model of competitive asset markets in which traders hold diversely coarse theories.
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That is, if R ranks a above a0 and R0 ranks a0 over a, then the rational-
expectations payo¤ranking of the two actions necessarily sides withR. When
R is fully connected and R0 is not, the property holds trivially. The following
result shows that this is the only case in which two DAGs can be unambigu-
ously ranked in terms of their expected performance.
Proposition 10 Let R;R0 be two DAGs that are not fully connected (and
in which the node that corresponds to the DMs action is isolated). Then,
neither DAG is more rational than the other.
The proof of this result is a simple application of FarkasLemma. Dom-
ination implies a linear relation between pR and pR0 , which can only mean
that R and R0 are equivalent.
5 Variations and Relation to Other Concepts
I begin the section with two extensions of the modeling framework.
A "Mixed" DAG representation
Dene the DM by a probability distribution  over DAGs, such that his sub-
jective belief is given by the following extension of the DAG representation:
p(x) =
X
R
(R)pR(x) (10)
This representation captures magnitudes of belief errors. When  mixes
between the true DAG R and some other DAG R, the magnitude of the
DMs error increases with (R). An example of a mixed representation is
"partial cursedness" (Eyster and Rabin (2005)).
Denition 5 is extendible to mixed DAG representations. Let  be a
distribution that assigns probability one to fully connected DAGs. Consider
two distributions ; 0 that do not assign probability one to fully connected
DAGs, and satisfy  =  + (1   )0, where  2 (0; 1). It is easy to see
that  is more rational than 0. Thus, mixed DAG representations enable us
to rank some types according to their performance.
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DAG heterogeneity
The motivation for personal equilibrium was that the DM confronts a "his-
torical database" that includes actions taken by other DMs who faced the
decision problem. Now relax the assumption that all DMs in this population
share the same subjective causal model. Let (R) denote the fraction of
DMs whose subjective DAG is R, and let p(a j R) be the probability that
they play the action a. Then, p(a) =
P
R (R)p(a j R), while p(y j a) is
the same for all DM types. The extended denition of personal equilibrium
requires that for every R for which (R) > 0, if p(a j R) > 0 then a max-
imizes
P
y pR(y j a)u(a; y). This extension has interesting implications for
the Dieters Dilemma. Assume that a fraction of the DM population holds
the correct causal model d ! c  h. This lowers the overall probability of
dieting, thus strengthening the empirical c h correlation. As a result, DMs
with the incorrect DAG will have a stronger tendency to diet.
Let us now turn to the relation between the Bayesian-network framework
and existing equilibrium models with non-rational expectations. Most of this
literature proceeded by postulating game-theoretic solution concepts that
capture di¤erent aspects of limited understanding of correlations. I briey
discuss the relation between some of these concepts (as dened for static
games) and the Bayesian-network formalism. For expositional simplicity, I
consider two-player games and examine the behavior of one player, to whom
I refer as the DM. Throughout the discussion,  represents a state of Nature
that is known by the opponent, and z denotes the games outcome (induced
by the two playersactions).
Analogy-based expectations
This concept was introduced by Jehiel (2005) in the context of extensive-form
games with complete information, and was later adapted to static Bayesian
games by Jehiel and Koessler (2008). The latter can be translated into the
Bayesian-networks language, as the following example illustrates. The true
DAG R is a! z   ! e, where e represents the "analogy class" to which
 belongs. For a DM with rational expectations, e is irrelevant and can be
omitted from his subjective model altogether. The DMs subjective DAG R
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is a! z  e  - i.e., R di¤ers from R only by changing the origin of the
link that goes into z, from  to e. Thus, the DM interprets the opponents
equilibrium behavior as if it were a measurable function of the analogy class,
rather than the actual state of Nature. To use the terms of Section 2, R
exhibits a "misattribution error" relative to R. The denition of Analogy-
Based Expectations Equilibrium (ABEE) requires the DMs action to be
subjectively optimal with respect to pR. Thus, we can reduce individual best-
replying under ABEE in static Bayesian games to subjective optimization
under the misspecied DAG R.16
Naive behavioral equilibrium
Esponda (2008) introduced a solution concept called "naive behavioral equi-
librium", which can be described as a renement of personal equilibrium for
a suitable specication of R and R. Let R be
a ! z  
& #
f
(11)
where f is a "learning feedback" variable.17 The DMs utility can be written
as a function of a; z; . The DMs subjective DAG R di¤ers from R by
removing the link  ! z. Like personal equilibrium in the present framework,
naive behavioral equilibrium requires the DMs action to be subjectively
optimal with respect to pR. However, it goes further by requiring pR(f) =
p(f) - i.e., the subjective marginal distribution over the feedback variable
should be unbiased. Because f is not an ancestral node in any DAG in
the equivalence class of R, Proposition 7 implies that Espondas additional
requirement is not vacuous. If there exists no personal equilibrium p for
which pR(f)  p(f), the set of naive behavioral equilibria will be empty. In
fact, if we substitute z = s and f = w, then (11) is none other than the
16Esyter and Picciones (2013) formalism can be similarly translated. Suppose that u
is purely a function of xM , M  N . The DMs subjective DAG omits some of the nodes
outside M . This DAG corresponds to Eyster and Picciones notion of an incomplete
theory. The DM in their model best-replies to the subjective belief pR.
17Esponda (2008) employs multiple feedback variables. My simplication does not vio-
late the spirit of Espondas approach.
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true DAG of Section 3.2; under the parameterization of that example, naive
behavioral equilibrium fails to exist.
For other parametrizations, Espondas additional requirement is satis-
ed and naive behavioral equilibrium coincides with personal equilibrium.
Esponda (2008) presents a monopsony example based on Samuelson and
Bazerman (1985), where an uninformed buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it of-
fer to an informed seller. This example can be translated as follows: a, ,
z and f represent the buyers o¤er, the sellers valuation, the nal alloca-
tion and the buyers gross payo¤ from it (f = 0 when there is no trade, and
f = +b when trade occurs, where b is a constant). The buyer fails to realize
that the probability of trade is a¤ected by the sellers valuation. Personal
equilibrium in this example has the feature that pR(f) is unbiased; hence it
coincides with naive behavioral equilibrium.18
Naive behavioral equilibrium is a concept in the tradition of self-conrming
equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine (1993)). In the present context, self-
conrming equilibrium would require the DM to play a best-reply to a sub-
jective belief q that satises q(f) = p(f) - that is, the only restriction on
the DMs subjective belief is that it is consistent with the feedback. The
present framework takes a di¤erent approach to modeling feedback: rather
than adding explicit feedback variables, it implicitly assumes that the DMs
feedback consists of the correlations that identify his causal model.
Partial cursedness
Suppose the true DAG is R : a ! z  . Let R di¤er from R only
by removing the link from  into z. The DM is characterized by a mixed
DAG representation (10) that assigns weight  to R and weight 1  to R.
This DM is "partially cursed" in the sense of Eyster and Rabin (2005); the
parameter  captures the extent to which the DM neglects the relationship
between his opponents action and information. The discussion at the end of
Section 4.3 implies that DMs with di¤erent values of  can be unambiguously
ordered in terms of their objective payo¤ performance: a DM with a lower 
is "more rational".
18Esponda and Pouzo (2014a) study an electoral model, in which individual voters
behavior can be translated into an informed-DM variation on the current specication.
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S (K ) equilibrium
Osborne and Rubinstein (1998) presented a solution concept in which each
player postulates a direct mapping from his action to the games payo¤-
relevant outcome, without forming an explicit belief regarding additional
variables. The player estimates this mapping by sampling each action K
times against the opponentsdistribution, and selecting the action that per-
forms best in his sample. The players misperception can be described in
terms of the Bayesian-network formalism. For instance, suppose that the
true DAG R is given by (11) and that u is purely a function of f . The DMs
subjective DAG is R : a ! f . In our model, the DMs behavior would be
consistent with rational expectations. However, this is because he perfectly
learns p(f j a), whereas in Osborne and Rubinstein (1998), he uses a nite
sample to estimate it and naively neglects the sampling error.
The organizing principle behind most concepts in this literature is that
the DMs beliefs are statistically correct with respect to partial feedback
about specic marginal or conditional probabilities; di¤erent concepts assume
di¤erent types of feedback. The Bayesian-network formalism systematizes
and generalizes this principle, via the requirement that the DM correctly
estimates the conditional distributions that identify his causal model.
Thus, the Bayesian-network representation of non-rational expectations
can be viewed as a unifying framework. What is the value of this unication?
First, it deepens our understanding of the relation between concepts. Second,
as the Dieters Dilemma taught us, the framework accommodates novel belief
distortions that previous concepts did not address: despite having an innite
amount of data, the dieter ends up believing in a correlation that does not
exist in reality.19 Third, the framework provides new tools for analyzing
implications of existing concepts: the analysis in Section 4.2 enables us to
see the reason that naive behavioral equilibrium may fail to exist, and the
analysis in Section 4.3 implies that DMs with di¤erent analogy partitions as
in Jehiel and Koessler (2008) cannot be ranked in terms of performance. As
19Most existing concepts capture underestimation of correlations due to coarseness. The
S(K) model generates spurious correlations, due to neglect of sampling error in small
samples.
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we will see in the concluding section, the framework has additional potential
benets in multi-agent models.
6 Concluding Remarks
The modeling framework developed in this paper enables us to analyze be-
havioral implications of systematic errors in statistical and causal reasoning -
mistaking correlation for causation, ignoring confounding variables, etc. Sta-
tistics teachers invest considerable e¤ort to "cure" students of such fallacies.
Indeed, one motivation behind the Bayesian-network literature has been to
systematize correct causal reasoning. Instead, this paper employed the tool
descriptively, to capture the very errors statisticians warn us against.
Throughout this paper, I interpreted the DMs subjective DAG as an
explicit causal model. I now discuss several alternative interpretations.
Objective data limitations. Certain DAGs can be interpreted as representa-
tions of objective feedback limitations that are faced by the DM as he tries to
learn p. Imagine that the DM only manages to learn the marginals of p over
some collections of variables, and that he wishes to extend these marginals
to a fully specied distribution over X. A result by Hajek et al. (1992)
implies that when R(i) is a clique for every i 2 N , there exists S  2N such
that pR is the maximal-entropy extension of the known marginals of p over
xS, S 2 S. Moreover, S is the set of maximal cliques in R. In this sense,
the DAG representation (2) can be justied as the outcome of systematic
extrapolation from limited data. In Spiegler (2015), I further develop the
limited-feedback foundation for the DAG representation, by considering a
more "behaviorally motivated" method of extrapolation.
Limited ability to perceive statistical patterns. In Section 2, I used a "Q&A
story" to illustrate the causal interpretation of R. However, the questions
can be interpreted di¤erently, as an attempt to nd statistical patterns in
the data. The DM is unable to grasp the multivariate distribution p in its
totality, and poses a sequence of partial queries that examine slices of p.
The DM behaves as if he has an explicit subjective causal model, but the
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essence of this bounded rationality is that he fails to ask the right questions
about p. The DAG R captures the questions that he can think of. For
instance, in the example of Section 3.2, observable variables are realized in
xed chronological order: parental investment comes rst, then the school
outcome is realized, followed by the wage. It is therefore natural for the
parent to pose questions that track this chronological order: What is the
likelihood of school success as a function of parental investment? How do
wages vary with school performance? These are the very questions that
identify the parents subjective DAG.20
Bayesian learning with misspecied priors. Esponda and Pouzo (2014b - EP
henceforth) proposed a game-theoretic framework, where each player is char-
acterized by a "subjective model" - a set of stochastic mappings from his
action a to a primitive set of payo¤-relevant consequences y (for simplicity,
assume players are uninformed). EPs denition of equilibrium requires the
players subjective distribution over y to be the closest (in the set implied by
his subjective model) to the true equilibrium distribution; distance is mea-
sured by a weighted Kullback-Leibler divergence. EP justify this concept as
the steady state of a process of Bayesian learning by forward-looking agents,
extending classical results on Bayesian learning with misspecied priors (Berk
(1966)). Personal equilibrium in the present paper can be viewed as an EP
equilibrium in single-player games, where the players subjective model is the
set of all conditional probabilities (pR(y j a))a;y that are consistent with the
DAG R.21
Although this paper has focused entirely on individual choice, the Bayesian-
network representation allows us to capture interactive situations in which
di¤erent agents view the same interaction through the prisms of di¤erent
subjective causal models. Existing notions of non-rational-expectations equi-
librium are typically presented as distinct solution concepts in some class of
games. The current framework reduces the element of non-rational expec-
20Esponda and Vespa (2014) interpret a pivotal-voting experiment in this spirit.
21Relatedly, there is a strand in the literature that views boundedly rational agents as
"time-series econometricians" who work with a misspecied model (e.g., Bray (1982), Cho,
Sargent and Williams (2002), Rabin and Vayanos (2010)).
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tations to individual agents types (their subjective DAGs) within a single
modeling framework. This reduction has several potential advantages. First,
it enables us to analyze interactions among agents who commit di¤erent
kinds of errors. Second, a model in which agents are characterized by dis-
tinct DAGs exhibits "structured belief heterogeneity", because agentsbeliefs
are di¤erent deterministic transformations of the same objective distribution
(e.g., when the latter is consistent with the empty DAG, all agents have
correct beliefs). Third, since the DAG representation is not tied to a partic-
ular economic model, it can be incorporated into diverse classes of models
(games, competitive markets). Finally, it provides a language for studying
"high-order" reasoning about boundedly rational expectations. By incorpo-
rating one agents DAG as a variable in another agents causal model, we
can express statements such as "player i does not understand the correlation
between player js understanding of correlations and his information". This
element is beyond the reach of current approaches, and I plan to explore it
in future research.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proposition 2
Fix (p(y j a))a;y. For a xed " 2 (0; 1), let Q" be the set of distributions
q 2 (A) such that q(a)  " for every a. Denote p = (q; (p(y j a))a;y), and
dene pR accordingly. Dene
BR(p) = arg max
q2Q"
X
a
q(a)
X
y
pR(y j a)u(a; y)
If q is an "-perturbed personal equilibrium, then q 2 BR(q). Because pR(y j
a) is continuous in q, BR is continuous as well. Also, the target function in
the denition of BR is linear in q; hence BR(p) is a convex set. Since the
set Q" is compact and convex, BR has a xed point, by Kakutanis theorem.
Therefore, an "-perturbed personal equilibrium exists for any " > 0. By
standard arguments, there is a convergent sequence of "-perturbed personal
equilibria.
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Proposition 4
The parents objective function is
P
s=0;1 p(s j a)p(w = 1 j s)  (a). By our
assumptions on p,  = 0 implies that s = w = 0 with certainty, whereas  = 1
implies that s = 1 with probability a. Let  denote the parents probability
measure over actions a. This implies the following conditional probabilities:
p(s = 1 j a) = a, p(w = 1 j s = 1) = 1, and
p(w = 1 j s = 0) = 0
R
a0 d(a
0)(1  a0)
1   +  R
a0 d(a
0)(1  a0) = 0
The derivative of the parents objective function is (1   0)  0(a). The
rst term, which represents the parents perceived marginal benet from
education, lies in (0; 1). The parent takes it as given when choosing a. The
second term is continuous and strictly increasing, with 0(0) = 0 and 0(1) >
1. Therefore, there is a unique best-reply a, which means that  assigns
probability one to a. In equilibrium, a solves the rst-order condition
0(a) = (1   0), where
 =
(1  a)
1   + (1  a) (12)
This gives the equation (6). Observe that 0(a) is continuous in a, with
0(0) = 0, 0(1)  1, whereas (1   0) is a strictly convex and increasing
function of a, which attains values strictly between 0 and 1. Therefore, the
two functions must cross at least once, such that (6) has a solution. When
0 is either weakly convex or weakly concave, the two functions cross exactly
once, such that the solution is unique.
Proposition 5
Denote p(a = 1) = . To calculate personal equilibria, we need to compute
the conditional probabilities that appear in (8). All of them were dened
up-front, except p(a j y), which is given by p(a = 1 j y = 1) = 1 and
p(a = 0 j y = 0) = 1  
(1  ) + 1   = 
Fix . The governments evaluation of each action a is
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X
y
p(y j a)[E(z j y)  y]
To calculate this expression for each a, let us rst derive E(z j y). Consider
the case of y = 1 rst. Because p(a = 1 j y = 1) = 1,
E(z j y = 1) =
X
e
p(e j a = 1)(1 + e) = 1 + 
Now consider the case of y = 0:
E(z j y = 0) =   0 + (1  ) 
X
e
p(e j a = 1)  e = (1  )
Recall that p(y = 1 j a) = a. Then, the governments evaluation of a = 0 is
(1  ), and its evaluation of a = 1 is
  [1 +    ] + (1  )  (1  )
By the denition of personal equilibrium,  > 0 ( < 0) only if the govern-
ments evaluation of a = 1 is weakly above its evaluation of a = 0. Plugging
the expressions for these evaluations and the denition of , we obtain the
result.
Proposition 6
The conditional probability pR(x2; :::; xn j x1) can be written as
p(x1) 
nY
i=2
p(xi j xR(i))
X
x02;:::;x0n
p(x1) 
nY
i=2
p(x0i j xR(i)\f1g; x0R(i) f1g)
and the term p(x1) cancels out. Recall that we are considering a modication
of p that changes the marginal of p on x1, while leaving p(x2; :::; xn j x1)
intact for all x. We need to check whether the term p(x0i j xR(i)\f1g; x0R(i) f1g)
is a¤ected, for i = 2; :::; n. If 1 2 R(i), the term is clearly unchanged. In
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contrast, when 1 =2 R(i), the term can be written as
p(x0i j x0R(i)) =
X
x
00
1
p(x001)p(x
0
i j x001; x0R(i))
The term p(x0i j x001; x0R(i)) is una¤ected by the modication of p. If it is not
constant in x001, we can nd a modication of p(x
0
1) for some values of x
0
1
such that the expression for pR(x2; :::; xn j x1) will change. In contrast, if
the probability is constant in x001 (i.e., p(x
0
i j x001; x0R(i)) = p(x0i j x0R(i)), the
expression for pR(x2; :::; xn j x1) is necessarily unchanged.
Proposition 8
By assumption, 1 is an ancestral node in R. By Proposition 7, pR(x1)  p(x1)
for every p. We can write pR(xM f1g j x1) = pR(xM)=pR(x1). Therefore,
pR(xM f1g j x1)  p(xM f1g j x1) if and only if pR(xM)  p(xM). By
Proposition 7, the latter holds if and only if M is an ancestral clique in a
DAG in the equivalence class of R. If pR(xM)  p(xM), the denition of
behavioral rationality is trivially satised. If pR(xM) 6= p(xM) for some p
and x, then we can easily construct u such that the DM will strictly prefer
an action that is objectively sub-optimal.
Proposition 9
(i) If i = 1 and j = n, then 1 /Rn; hence f1; ng cannot be a clique (let alone
an ancestral one) in any DAG in the equivalence class of R.
(ii) If i; j 6= n, then iRn, jRn and yet i and j are not linked. By Proposition
1, these properties must hold in any DAG in the equivalence class of R, which
means that f1; ng cannot be an ancestral clique in any such DAG.
(iii) If j = n and i 6= 1, then R is a perfect DAG - i.e., R(k) is a clique for
every k 2 N . It is well-known that every clique in a perfect DAG is ancestral
in some DAG in its equivalence class (see Spiegler (2015) for details). Note
that R(n)[ fng is a clique because the only link that was removed from the
original fully connected DAG was i ! n. Therefore, f1; ng is an ancestral
clique in some DAG in the equivalence class of R.
The result follows from (i)  (iii), by Proposition 8.
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Proposition 10
If R and R0 are equivalent, the claim holds trivially. Now assume there
exist non-equivalent R;R0 that are not fully connected, such that R is more
rational than R0. Fix p and denote q = (pR(y))y, r = (pR0(y))y. Both q and
r are probability vectors of length n   1. I use pi; qi; ri to denote the i-th
component of the (n 1) vectors p; q; r. Dene the (n 1)-vector z as follows:
for each y, zy = u(a; y)  u(a0; y). Consider the (n  1) 3 matrix
D =
r1  q1  p1
...
...
...
rn 1  qn 1  pn 1
Let b = ( "; "; ") be a vector in R3, where " > 0 is arbitrarily small. The
assumption that R is more rational than R0 thus implies that there exists
no z that satises the inequality Dz > bT . By Farkass Lemma, this means
that there is a vector a > 0 in R3, such that there DTa = 0 (and since
a > 0, baT < 0). Thus, ri = a
2
a1
qi + a
3
a1
pi for every i = 1; :::; n   1. SincePn 1
i=1 r
i =
Pn 1
i=1 q
i =
Pn 1
i=1 p
i = 1 by assumption, a1 = a2 + a3, such that
the claim holds with  = a3=(a2 + a3).
We have thus established that for any p, we can nd  2 (0; 1) such that
pR = p + (1   )pR0 . In particular, for any p that is consistent with R,
pR = p and so the equation reduces to pR = pR0 . Likewise, for any p that
is consistent with R0, pR0 = p and again we obtain pR = pR0 . It follows
that the sets of distributions that are consistent with R and R0 are identical,
contradicting the assumption that R and R0 are not equivalent.
Appendix B: d-Separation
In this appendix I present the concept of d-separation, which is useful for
applying the characterization of consequentialistj rationality in Section 4.1.
A path in a DAG R is a sequence of directly connected nodes in R, ignoring
the linksdirections.
Denition 6 (Blocking a path) A subset D  N blocks a path in R if
either of the following two conditions holds: (1) the path contains a segment
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of the form i ! m ! j or i  m ! j such that m 2 D; (2) the path
contains a segment of the form i ! m  j such that neither m nor any of
its descendants are in D.
To illustrate this denition, consider the DAG R : 1! 2 3! 4. The
path between nodes 1 and 4 is blocked by f3g - either because it contains
the segment 2 3! 4 (thus satisfying condition (1)) or because it contains
the segment 1! 2 3 (thus satisfying condition (2), as the node 2 has no
descendants and 2 =2 f3g). However, the path between 1 and 4 is not blocked
by f2g, because it does not contain a segment of the form i ! 2 ! j or
i  2 ! j, and the only segment of the form i ! m  j that it contains
satises m = 2.
Denition 7 (d-separation) Let B;C;D be disjoint subsets of N . We say
that B and C are d-separated by D (in a DAG R) if D blocks every path
between any node in B and any node in C.
Proposition 11 (Verma and Pearl (1990)) Let B;C;D be disjoint sub-
sets of N . Then, xB ?R xC j xD if and only if B and C are d-separated by
D in R.
Thus, d-separation provides a convenient rule for checking whether a con-
ditional independence property is satised by all the distributions that are
consistent with a DAG. Moreover, the rule is computationally simple: Geiger
et al. (1990) presented a linear-time algorithm for checking d-separation.
Armed with this result, I illustrate Proposition 6, using two specications
from Section 3.
Ignoring a confounder (Section 3.2). The true DAG R is given by (5), and
R : a ! s ! w. Because a =2 R(w) = fsg, Proposition 6 requires us to
check whether w ?R a j s. To see why this condition fails, observe that
a ! s   ! w is a path in R that connects a and w. This path is
not blocked by s (as we saw in the example that illustrated blocking), and
therefore a and w are not d-separated by s.
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Ignoring an endogenous e¤ect (Section 3.3). The true DAG R is given by
(7) and R : a ! y ! z. Since a 2 R(y) and a =2 R(z) = fyg, we only need
to check that z ?R a j y - i.e., that a and z are d-separated by y in R. This
condition is violated, because R contains the path a! e! z, which is not
blocked by y. It follows that consequentialistj rationality is violated.
Appendix C: The Case of an Informed DM
In this appendix I extend the decision model to the case in which the DM re-
ceives a signal x0 2 X0 prior to making his decision. Thus, x = (x0; x1; :::; xn).
I use the notations x0 and t interchangeably, and often write x = (t; a; y).
All DAGs are now dened over N = f0; 1; 2:::; ng, such that
pR(x) =
nY
i=0
p(xi j xR(i))
Assume that in all DAGs, whether true or subjective, the DMs signal is the
sole direct cause of his action - i.e., R(1) = R(1) = f0g.
The extension of the denition of personal equilibrium is straightforward.
Let p have full support on T . We say that p0 is a perturbation of p if p0(t) 
p(t), p0(y j t; a)  p(y j t; a), and p0 has full support on T  A.
Denition 8 A distribution p 2 (X) with full support on T  A is an
"-perturbed personal equilibrium if
a 2 arg max
a0
X
y
pR(y j t; a0)u(t; a0; y)
for every t; a for which p(a j t) > ". A distribution p 2 (X) with full
support on T is a personal equilibrium if there exists a sequence pk ! p
of perturbations of p, as well as a sequence "k ! 0, such for every k, pk is
an "k-perturbed personal equilibrium.
As in the basic model of Section 2, the object of the denition of per-
sonal equilibrium is the entire joint distribution p. An alternative approach
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would x p(t) and p(y j t; a) and regard p(a j t) as the denitions object.
However, this would give an impression of an extensive-game-like chain of
causation from t to y via a, an impression that would be misleading in many
applications.
The existence result given by Proposition 2 extends to this case.
An example: Illusion of control
As in Section 3.2, consider a parent who makes a decision regarding his
childs education. There are three variables, denoted a; s; v, representing the
parents investment decision, the childs school performance, and the parents
valuation of success at school. The parent is informed of v before making
his choice. The true DAG R : a  v ! s. Thus, s is independent of a
conditional on v. One story behind the causal link v ! s is that the parents
values are imbued in the child and a¤ect her attitude to learning. If the
parent had rational expectations, he would choose a to maximize
P
s p(s j
v)u(v; a; s).
Now suppose that the parents subjective DAG is R : v ! a! s. Thus,
R departs from R by changing the origin of the link that goes into s. This
link reorientation captures a misattribution error often referred to as "illusion
of control" (Langer (1975)): in reality, s is caused by the exogenous variable
v, yet the parent attributes s to his own action. As in Section 3.2, the
parents error is that he mishandles a confounding variable. The di¤erence
is that while in the previous example the parent neglected the confounder
altogether, here he is aware of it (indeed, he conditions his action on it),
yet he fails to perceive its role as a confounder. The parent interprets any
correlation between a and s as a causal e¤ect of a on s, whereas in reality
the correlation is due to the confounder. In personal equilibrium, whenever
p(a0 j v) > 0,
a0 2 arg max
a
X
s
p(s j a)u(v; a; s) =
X
v
p(v j a)
X
s
p(s j v)u(v; a; s) (13)
As the term p(v j a) indicates, the equilibrium aspect of individual behavior
is fundamental in this example.
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Let us add structure to the example. All variables take values in f0; 1g.
Assume p(v = 1) =  and p(s = 1 j v) = v, where  2 (0; 1). Finally, let
u(v; a; s) = vs  a, where  2 (0; 1) is a constant. Thus, the child succeeds
at school if and only if her family thinks it is important. The action a = 1 is
a useless investment in the childs education, and  is its cost. If the parent
had rational expectations, he would choose a = 0 for every v, because the
costly action does not a¤ect the childs school performance. The following
result characterizes personal equilibria under the parents subjective DAG.
Proposition 12 There are multiple personal equilibria. In one equilibrium,
p(a = 1 j v) = 0 for all v. In another, p(a = 1 j v) = v. Finally, if  > 1 ,
there is a third equilibrium, in which
p(a = 1 j v) = v   +   1

Proof. When the parents information is v = 0, playing a = 0 is optimal
regardless of his beliefs. Therefore, in any personal equilibrium, p(a = 1 j v =
0) = 0. Let us try to sustain p(a = 1 j v = 1) = 0 in equilibrium. Because
the action a = 1 is never taken in this putative equilibrium, we need to check
whether there is a sequence of "-perturbed personal equilibria that converges
to p. For every " > 0, dene p"(a = 1 j v) = " for all v, p"(v)  p(v) and
p"(s j v)  p(s j v). Then, p"(s = 1 j a = 0)  p"(s = 1 j a = 1); hence
playing a = 0 is subjective optimal, which is consistent with the denition
of "-perturbed personal equilibrium.
Now, let us try to sustain personal equilibria in which p(a = 1 j v = 1) =
 > 0. Then, p(v = 1 j a = 1) = 1 and
p(v = 1 j a = 0) = (1  )
1   + (1  ) =
   
1  
It follows that when the parents information is v = 1, his evaluation of a = 1
is 1   , whereas his evaluation of a = 0 is (   )=(1   ). Therefore,
 > 0 if and only if 1     (   )=(1   ). This inequality is binding
if  2 (0; 1). Since  < 1, the inequality holds for  = 1. If  > 1   , the
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inequality can hold bindingly with  = ( +   1)=.
This result demonstrates several e¤ects. At the substantive level, it is
possible to sustain a sub-optimal equilibrium, in which parents make a use-
less investment in their childrens education if and only if they care about
school performance. Thanks to the positive correlation between v and s, this
behavioral pattern is consistent: the parent mistakenly attributes success at
school to the investment; and since only high-valuation parents make the
investment, a and s will be positively correlated. The parents erroneous
causal interpretation of this correlation aligns it with their incentives. At
the methodological level, Proposition 12 highlights the role of "trembles"
in sustaining personal equilibria: the rational-expectations outcome is sus-
tainable because the parents o¤-equilibrium experimentation is uncorrelated
with his information, in which case he is not led to attribute variations in
school performance to variations in investment.
Consequentialist rationality
Let us extend the notion of consequentialistj rationality to the case of an
informed DM.
Denition 9 A DAG R is consequentialistically rational with respect
to the true DAG R if for every pair of distributions p; q that are consistent
with R, if p(t) = q(t) and p(y j t; a) = q(y j t; a) for every t; a; y, then
pR(y j t; a) = qR(y j t; a) for every t; a; y.
Proposition 13 The subjective DAG R is consequentialistically rational with
respect to the true DAG R if and only if:
1. For every i > 1, if 1 =2 R(i), then xi ?R x1 j xR(i)[f0g.
2. For every i > 1, if 0 =2 R(i), then xi ?R x0 j xR(i)[f1g.
3. If R(0) 6= ?, then x1 ?R xR(0) j x0.
Proof. Recall that t = x0, a = x1, y = (x2; :::; xn). By assumption, R(1) =
R(1) = f0g. Hence, by the asymmetry of R and R, 1 =2 R(0); R(0). We
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can thus write pR(y j a; t) = pR(x2; :::; xn j x0; x1) as
nY
i=0
p(xi j xR(i))
X
x02;:::;x0n
p(x0 j x0R(0))  p(x1 j x0) 
nY
i=2
p(x0i j xR(i)\f0;1g; x0R(i) f0;1g)
=
Y
i 6=1
p(xi j xR(i))
X
x02;:::;x0n
p(x0 j x0R(0)) 
nY
i=2
p(x0i j xR(i)\f0;1g; x0R(i) f0;1g)
(14)
Recall that we are considering modications of p that change p(x1 j x0)
for some x0; x1, while leaving the marginal of p on x0 and the conditional
distributions p(x2; :::; xn j x0; x1) intact. Both p and its modication are
required to be consistent with R. Let us now examine each of the terms in
(14). If all terms are invariant to any eligible modication of p, so will be
(14) itself; otherwise, there is an eligible modication of p that changes (14).
(i) For any xR(0); x0, the term p(x0 j xR(0)) can be written as follows:
p(x0 j xR(0)) =
p(x0)
P
x01
p(x01 j x0)p(xR(0) j x01; x0)P
x00
p(x00)
P
x01
p(x01 j x00)p(xR(0) j x01; x00)
The term p(x0) is by denition invariant to the modication of p. As to
p(xR(0) j x01; x0), we saw that R(0)  f2; :::; ng. By denition, p(x2; :::; xn j
x1; x0) is invariant to the modication of p. Since
p(xR(0) j x1; x0) =
X
xf2;:::;ng R(0)
p(x2; :::; xn j x1; x0)
It follows that p(xR(0) j x01; x0) is invariant to the modication of p. Suppose
that p(xR(0) j x01; x0) is not constant in x1. Then, we can nd a distribution p
that is consistent with R and an eligible modication of p that will change
p(x0 j xR(0)). In particular, let all variables xi, i =2 R(0), be independently
distributed under p. The only term in (14) that will change as a result of
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the modication of p is p(x0 j xR(0)), and therefore (14) will change, too. In
contrast, if p(xR(0) j x01; x0) is constant in x1, then p(x0 j xR(0)) is invariant
to any eligible modication of p.
(ii) For any i > 0 and any xi; xR(i), if 1 =2 R(i) and 0 2 R(i), then the term
p(xi j xR(i)) can be written as follows
p(xi j xR(i)) =
X
x1
p(x1 j xR(i))p(xi j x1; xR(i))
=
X
x1
 
p(x0)p(x1 j x0)p(xB j x1; x0)P
x01
p(x0)p(x01 j x0)p(xB j x01; x0)
!
p(xi j x1; x0; xB)
where B = R(i)   f0g. By denition, the terms p(x0), p(xB j x1; x0) and
p(xi j x1; x0; xB) are invariant to the modication of p. Suppose that p(xi j
x1; x0; xB) is not constant in x1. Then, we can nd a distribution p that is
consistent with R and an eligible modication of p that will change p(xi j
xR(i)). In particular, let all variables xj, j > 0, j 6= i, be independently
distributed under p. The only term in (14) that will change as a result of
the modication of p is p(xi j xR(i)), and therefore (14) will change, too. In
contrast, if p(xi j x1; x0; xB) is constant in x1, then p(xi j xR(i)) is invariant
to any eligible modication of p.
(iii) For any i > 0 and any xi; xR(i), if 0 =2 R(i) and 1 2 R(i), then the term
p(xi j xR(i)) can be written as follows
p(xi j xR(i)) =
X
x0
 
p(x0)p(x1 j x0)p(xC j x1; x0)P
x00
p(x00)p(x1 j x00)p(xC j x1; x00)
!
p(xi j x1; x0; xC)
where C = R(i)   f1g. By denition, the terms p(x0), p(xC j x1; x0) and
p(xi j x1; x0; xC) are invariant to the modication of p. Using essentially the
same argument as in (ii), we can show that if p(xi j x1; x0; xC) is constant
in x0, then p(xi j xR(i)) is invariant to any eligible modication of p; and if
p(xi j x1; x0; xC) is not constant in x0, we can nd a distribution p that is
consistent with R and an eligible modication of p that will change p(xi j
xR(i)).
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(iv) For any i > 0 and any xi; xR(i), if 1; 0 =2 R(i), then the term p(xi j xR(i))
can be written as follows
p(xi j xR(i)) = p(x0 j xR(i))p(x1 j x0; xR(i))p(xi j x1; x0; xR(i))
where
p(x0 j xR(i)) =
P
x01
p(x0)p(x
0
1 j x0)p(xR(i) j x01; x0)P
x00
P
x01
p(x00)p(x
0
1 j x00)p(xR(i) j x01; x00)
p(x1 j x0; xR(i)) =
p(x0)p(x1 j x0)p(xR(i) j x1; x0)P
x01
p(x0)p(x01 j x0)p(xR(i) j x01; x0)
By denition, the terms p(x0), p(xR(i) j x1; x0) and p(xi j x1; x0; xR(i)) are
invariant to the modication of p. Using essentially the same argument as in
(ii), we can show that if p(xi j x1; x0; xR(i)) is constant in x1; x0, then p(xi j
xR(i)) is invariant to any eligible modication of p; and if p(xi j x1; x0; xR(i))
is not constant in x1; x0, we can nd a distribution p that is consistent with
R and an eligible modication of p that will change p(xi j xR(i)).
The rst condition in Proposition 13 is a minor variation on the condition
for consequentialistj rationality in the uninformed-DM case. The second is
an analogous condition for the new variable x0. The third condition is that
under the true DAG, the DMs action is independent of the signals immediate
(subjective) causes conditional on the signal. Let us illustrate this result
using two specications.
Cursedness. The true DAG R is a ta   ! tb ! b, where  represents a
state of Nature, ta and tb represents the signals obtained by the DM and his
opponent, and a and b represent their actions. The subjective DAG R di¤ers
from R by changing the origin of the link that goes into b, from tb to ta. This
specication captures a "fully cursed", partially informed DM, as in Eyster
and Rabin (2005). Condition (1) in Proposition 13 holds because the node ta
blocks any path in R between the node a and any other node. Condition (2)
holds vacuously because ta is the sole cause of b under R. Finally, Condition
(3) holds because a ?R  j ta. Therefore, consequentialistj rationality holds.
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Illusion of control. The true DAG is R : a  v ! s, while the subjective
DAG is R : v ! a ! s. Since v =2 R(s) = fag, the second condition for
consequentialistj rationality requires that s ?R v j a, which is clearly false.
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